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Fiscal Multipliers and the Labour Market in the Open Economy
* 
 
Several contributions have recently assessed the size of fiscal multipliers both in RBC 
models and New Keynesian models. None of the studies considers a model with frictional 
labour markets which is a crucial element, particularly at times in which much of the fiscal 
stimulus has been directed toward labour market measures. We use an open economy 
model (more specifically, a currency area calibrated to the European Monetary Union) with 
labour market frictions in the form of labour turnover costs and workers’ heterogeneity to 
measure fiscal multipliers. We compute short and long run multipliers and open economy 
spillovers for five types of fiscal packages: pure demand stimuli and consumption tax cuts 
return very small multipliers; income tax cuts and hiring subsidies deliver larger multipliers, as 
they reduce distortions in sclerotic labour markets; short-time work (German “Kurzarbeit”) 
returns negative short-run multipliers, but stabilises employment. Our model highlights a 
novel dimension through which multipliers operate, namely the labour demand stimulus 
which occurs in a model with non-walrasian labour markets. 
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comments. 1 Introduction
Many alternative estimates of the ￿scal multiplier have taken the scene of the recent debate over
the impact of ￿scal stimuli in the time of crisis. Following the Romer and Bernstein [24] estimates
of the impact of an increase in government spending on GDP and employment in the United States,
several other authors have revised estimates of the so called ￿scal multiplier o⁄ering less favorable
scenarios (see for instance Cogan, Cwik, Taylor and Wieland [7], Cwik and Wieland [9], Uhlig
[28]).1 All of those studies have been conducted using stylized RBC or New Keynesian models
and by referring mainly to the US economy. Moreover they have compared broad ￿scal measures
(increases in government expenditure versus tax cuts) with no reference to speci￿c targets such
as the labour market. In most cases, the analyses have neglected the spillovers induced by ￿scal
packages across countries (for an exception, see Corsetti, Meier and M￿ller [8]).
The purpose of this paper is threefold. First, we aim at reconsidering measures of the ￿scal
multiplier in a model with equilibrium unemployment along the extensive margin and with labour
market frictions in the form of labour turnover costs which allow for an endogenous determination
of hiring and ￿ring decisions. Indeed, the reference model is essential to judge the quantitative
impact of a ￿scal package. We show that labour turnover costs reduce the multiplier on traditional
government spending, while they increase the multiplier on income tax cuts. Second, we are
interested in comparing the impact of ￿scal packages with diverse targets; government spending
can indeed be directed toward speci￿c labour market targets such as hiring or wage subsidies.
Third, considering that di⁄erent countries have adopted diverse ￿scal measures both in terms of
size and targets, we are interested in evaluating the open economy spillovers. For this reason, we
use an open economy model. Importantly, in our model spillover e⁄ects materialize in two di⁄erent
ways: ￿rst, changes in government expenditure, by a⁄ecting domestic demand, have an impact on
the dynamics of terms of trade; second, changes in terms of trade have an impact on relative wages
across countries and worker ￿ ows.
For this analysis, we use a two country model (more speci￿cally, a currency area calibrated
to the European Monetary Union, EMU) with labour market frictions in the form of ￿ring and
1Christiano, Eichenbaum and Rebelo [6] point out that government spending multipliers may be large when the
zero bound on nominal interest rates is binding.
2hiring costs. We extend the labour market model by Lechthaler, Merkl and Snower [15] to a
monetary union setting. This model has several advantages in the context of our analysis. First,
it contains European type labour market institutions, such as ￿ring costs and bargaining between
incumbent worker and ￿rms. Thus, it is a particularly realistic representation for our exercise,
which we targeted to the EMU. Second, the model does not su⁄er from the Shimer [25] puzzle,
i.e., it generates strong labour market ampli￿cation e⁄ects in response to macroeconomic shocks.
This may be particularly important when we analyse measures that are targeted to the labour
market (to generate realistic quantitative responses). Further, the model can replicate several other
important features of the data, such as strong persistence and appropriate correlations of labour
market variables. Third, since the model contains a productivity distribution, this enables us to
analyse measures such as short-time work, which were recently implemented by several European
governments. We are the ￿rst to analyse this type of measure from a microfounded dynamic model
perspective.
Worker ￿ ows and wages in our model are determined by a variety of indicators, such as
unemployment bene￿ts, ￿ring and hiring costs, taxes. The combination of those indicators allows
us to design several alternative scenarios of ￿scal packages. The ￿scal packages are meant to capture
the actual plans approved by various countries; for this reason we allow for various type of taxes
(on consumption, on labour income, on ￿rms￿pro￿ts and lump sum transfers) and various targets
for government spending (traditional boosts of aggregate demand, hiring subsidies and short-time
work).
We assume temporary ￿scal shocks2 ￿nanced with future lump sum taxes3 and compute short
run and long run multipliers and spillovers across countries for ￿ve types of ￿scal packages: pure
demand stimulus, consumption tax cut, income tax cut, hiring subsidies, short-time work (German
"Kurzarbeit"). Of particular interest are the last two as they induce a shift in the endogenous
determination of hiring and ￿ring thresholds and thereby a⁄ect average productivity.
2This seems realistic as in the aftermath of the crisis most ￿scal packages included temporary interventions.
3Lump-sum taxes allow us to isolate the e⁄ects of the respective stimulus measures. We are aware that lump-sum
taxes are not readily available to policy makers. However, the main focus of our analysis is in comparing the e⁄ects of
the ￿ve di⁄erent measures and for this exercise. The precise ￿nancing is not important, since all measures are ￿nanced
in the same way. Furthermore, it remains unclear how governments will consolidate their budget in the medium run.
A consolidation by raising VAT taxes would only have minor output e⁄ects in our model, a consolidation by raising
income taxes would reduce output substantially, while a consolidation by medium-run government spending cuts
would have positive short-run e⁄ects (see Corsetti, Meier and M￿ller [8] for the latter).
3We ￿nd that multipliers are nearly zero for cuts in the consumption tax, small but positive for
government spending and large for hiring subsidies and cuts in the income tax (for the latter only
in the long-run). Income tax cuts are bene￿cial as they reduce bargained wages (before taxes) and
stimulate labour demand in a model with ine¢ cient unemployment. Hiring subsidies help to reduce
labour market distortions, hence they boost output. On the contrary, the extension of short-time
work delivers negative output multipliers in the short run, as this measure increases the number
of employed workers but endogenously reduces their productivity. However, short-time work can
be used to stabilise the number of employed workers and delivers substantial multipliers in the
long-run. Interestingly, our model highlights a novel dimension through which multipliers operate,
namely the labour demand stimulus which occurs in a model with non-walrasian labour markets.
Speci￿cally, any measure that abates the adjustment of wages or that reduces distortionary hiring
costs, stabilizes ine¢ cient unemployment ￿ uctuations and ampli￿es both short run and long run
output responses. In this respect, our multipliers are largely driven by a supply-side mechanism
rather than by a traditional demand-side mechanism.
A widespread concern is that large ￿scal stimuli might induce potential free-riding from neigh-
bouring countries due to the positive demand spillovers. We ￿nd small spillover e⁄ects. Finally,
in order to add realism to the model, we test and con￿rm our results under two alternative as-
sumptions: a) announced versus unannounced policies, b) ￿scal intervention versus no intervention
when starting from a recession scenario.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the alternative ￿scal pack-
ages undertaken by various countries. Section 3 describes the model economy. Section 4 shows
quantitative results on the ￿scal multipliers. Section 5 puts our work in the perspective of the
relevant empirical work. Section 6 concludes.
2 Fiscal Packages Across Countries
In this section, we provide an overview of the di⁄erent packages undertaken by various countries
following the current ￿nancial crisis. We refer to the four main Euro area countries, to the US
and the UK. We describe both, the size of the ￿scal stimuli and the target chosen for directing
government expenditures. Sources for the information provided in this section are in Appendix 1.
4For the year 2008-2009 Germany has passed the so-called ￿Konjunkturpaket I & II.￿The total
size of the package is e80 billions. An amount of e14 billions has been directed toward the labour
market in the form of an extension of short-time work and support to quali￿cation programmes.
An amount of e20 billions has taken the form of traditional public spending. At last, the stimulus
has included various tax cuts.
For the year 2009-2010 France has passed the ￿Plan de relance.￿The total size of the package
is e65 billions, of which e33 billions has been allocated to total expenditures, while the remaining
part has been allocated to tax cuts. Out of the total expenditures an amount of e0.5 billions
has been devoted to labour market measures, namely support of short-time work and increases in
unemployment bene￿ts.
For the years 2009-2012 Italy has approved the ￿Pacchetto ￿scale￿ which consists of e80
billions over the next three years. The amount devoted to public spending is e16.6 billions in
2010, mainly spent in infrastructure. An amount of e 4 billions will be spent in labour market
programmes, speci￿cally a limited extension of unemployment bene￿t coverage and measures to
stabilize the demand side of the labour market (short-time work). A limited amount of resources
has been devoted to temporary tax cuts in the form of family bonuses and ￿nancial support for
low-income households.
For the year 2009-2010 Spain has passed ￿El Plan E.￿Total package: e37.8 billions. Measures
in the labour market have mainly taken the form of increases in unemployment bene￿ts coverage.
Furthermore, some resources have been devoted to ￿nancial support for self-employed people. Pub-
lic spending by an amount of e21 billions has been allocated to local investments and traditional
government spending. Finally, an amount of e6 billions has been allocated to tax savings.
In the Pre-Budget Report 2008 the United Kingdom has approved a ￿scal plan for an amount
of £20 billions. Part of it has been spent in the labour market in the form of increased capacity
within job centers, provision of a guaranteed job training or work placement for all 18-24-year old
who reach 12 months of unemployment. Public spending by an amount of £3 billions has been
allocated to capital expenditures. Finally, there have been tax cuts for £12.4 billions in the form
of a temporary cut in VAT from 17.5 % to 15 %.
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 passed in the United States covers an
5amount of US$787 billions. Measures directed to support the labour market take up to US$40
billions. This amount has been mainly devoted to an extension of unemployment bene￿ts coverage.
Traditional public spending takes up US$94.7 billions of the resources. Finally, US$288 billions
have been allocated to a tax relief plan in the form of federal tax cuts and incentives.
3 An Open Economy Model with Labour Turnover Costs
Our reference model for the labour market is Lechthaler et el. [15] and Faia et al. [11].4 Each
economy is populated by households who consume di⁄erent varieties of domestically produced and
imported goods, save and work. Households save in both, domestic and internationally traded
bonds. Each agent can be either employed or unemployed. The labour market in each country
features labour turnover costs, while wages are determined according to a right to manage bargain-
ing process. We endogenise hiring and ￿ring decisions, by assuming that the pro￿tability of each
worker is subject to an i.i.d. shock each period. Firms in each country can change their price in
any period, but price-changes are subject to quadratic adjustment costs.
The tax system is articulated as follows: distortionary taxes are levied on consumption, wage
income and ￿rms￿pro￿ts. The government can ￿nance expenditure or tax cuts with a mixture
of current government bonds and future lump sum taxes. Fiscal stimuli can be directed toward
aggregate demand, taxes or toward labour market measures.
3.1 Households in the Domestic Economy
In the following, we derive the maximization problems for the domestic economy. The ones for the
foreign economy are symmetric.










where c denotes aggregate consumption in ￿nal goods. Total real labour income is given by wt
and is speci￿ed below. Unemployed household members, ut,5 receive an unemployment bene￿t, ub.
4The mentioned papers analyse labour turnover costs in a closed economy model and do not touch ￿scal policy
issues.
5ut denotes the unemployment rate. But as the labor force, L, is normalised to 1, ut is equal to the number of
unemployed workers.
6The contract signed between the worker and the ￿rm speci￿es the wage and is obtained through
a Nash bargaining process. In order to ￿nance consumption at time t each agent also invests in
foreign non-state contingent nominal bonds, b￿
t; which are internationally traded and which pay
a gross nominal interest rate (1 + i
f
t ) one period later. As in Andolfatto [2] and Merz [18], it is
assumed that workers can insure themselves against earning uncertainty and unemployment. For
this reason, the wage earnings have to be interpreted as net of insurance costs. Finally, agents
receive pro￿ts from the ￿rms which they own, ~ ￿a;t, pay lump sum taxes, ￿t, a consumption tax,
￿c
t, a wage income tax, ￿n
t , and a tax on pro￿ts, ￿
p
t. The sequence of budget constraints in terms
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Households choose the set of processes fct;b￿
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and the initial wealth b￿
0 so as to maximize (1) subject to (2). The following optimality conditions
must hold:













t = ￿t: (4)
Equation (3) is the optimality condition with respect to internationally traded bonds. Equation (4)
is the marginal utility of consumption. Optimality requires that a No-Ponzi condition on wealth is
also satis￿ed.
Arbitrage condition and accumulation of assets. Due to imperfect capital mobility
and/or in order to capture the existence of intermediation costs in foreign asset markets, workers
pay a spread between the interest rate on the foreign currency portfolio and the interest rate of













6See Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe [23].
7where ￿ > 0, ￿0 > 0 and it is the interest rate of the currency union. In addition, we assume that
the initial distribution of wealth between the two countries is symmetric.
Workers in the Foreign Region. We assume throughout that all goods are traded, that
both countries face the same composition of consumption bundles and that the law of one price
holds. This implies that ph;t = p￿
h;t and pf;t = p￿
f;t. Under the currency union assumption, the
nominal exchange rate is equal one. Foreign workers face an allocation of expenditure and wealth
similar to the one of workers in the domestic region except for the fact that they do not pay an
additional spread for investing in the international portfolio. The e¢ ciency condition for bond
holdings reads as follows:
￿￿










All other optimality conditions are like in the home region. After substituting equation (5) into


























which states that marginal utilities across countries are equalized up to the spread for the country
risk.
3.2 Demand Aggregation and Open Economy Relations
The ￿nal good c in the domestic country is obtained by assembling domestic and imported inter-























1￿￿ being the corresponding price index and where ￿ represents the
elasticity between domestic and foreign goods while ￿ < 0:5 measures the degree of home-bias.












"￿1 as the composite aggre-
gates of domestic and imported intermediate goods respectively, with " being the elasticity across








"￿1 being the respective
price indices.
8Optimal demand for domestic and foreign goods is given by:











All the relations hold symmetrically for the foreign country.
For expositional convenience, we now express all aggregators as functions of in￿ ation and the





The terms of trade can be related to the CPI-PPI ratio as follows
pt
ph;t




1￿￿ ￿ g(st); (11)
with g
0
(st) > 0. A equivalent relation holds for the ratio d(st) ￿
pt
pf;t: We can therefore express the
demand functions for domestic and foreign goods as follows:
ch;t = (1 ￿ ￿)(g(st))
￿ ct , (12)
cf;t = ￿(d(st))
￿ ct: (13)
Finally, we need to obtain the relation between terms of trade and nominal exchange rates
















are respectively the domestic and the foreign PPI in￿ ation rate.











93.3 Production and the Labour Market in the Domestic Economy
In each country there are three types of ￿rms. (i) Firms that produce intermediate goods employ
labour, exhibit linear labour adjustment costs (i.e. hiring and ￿ring costs) and sell their homoge-
nous products on a perfectly competitive market to the wholesale sector. (ii) Firms in the wholesale
sector transform the intermediate goods into consumption goods and sell them under monopolis-
tic competition to the retailers. They can change their price at any time but price adjustments
are subject to quadratic Rotemberg [22] adjustment cost. (iii) The retailers, in turn, aggregate
the consumption goods and sell them under perfect competition to the households. We charac-
terise the optimization problems of households in the domestic economy. The foreign residents act
symmetrically.
3.3.1 Intermediate Goods Producers and Employment Dynamic
Intermediate goods ￿rms hire labour to produce the intermediate good z. Their production function
is:
zt = atNt; (17)
where a is technology and N the number of employed workers. They sell the product at a relative
price mct = pz;t=ph;t which they take as given in a perfectly competitive environment, where pz
is the absolute price of the intermediate good evaluated in domestic goods and ph is the domestic
price index. The variable mct in this economy plays the role of marginal costs as it represents the
lagrange multiplier on the production function.
We assume that every worker (employed or unemployed) is subject to a random operating
cost ", which follows a logistic probability distribution g("t) over the support ￿1 to +1.7 The
operating costs can be interpreted as an idiosyncratic shock to a worker￿ s productivity or as a
match-speci￿c idiosyncratic cost-shock. The ￿rms learn the value of the operating costs of every
worker at the beginning of a period and base their employment decisions on it, i.e., an unemployed
worker with a favorable shock will be employed while an employed worker with a bad shock will
7The logistic distribution was chosen because it is very similar to the normal distribution, but in contrast to the
latter there is a neat expression for the cumulative density function.
10be ￿red. Hiring and ￿ring is not costless, ￿rms have to pay linear hiring costs, h, and linear ￿ring
costs, f, both measured in terms of the ￿nal consumption good. Wages are determined through
Nash bargaining between insiders and the ￿rm. The bargaining process takes the form of a right to
manage. This assumption leads to the following timing of events. First, the operating cost shock
takes place and median insiders and the intermediate goods ￿rm bargain over the wage8. Given
the wage schedule, ￿rms make their hiring and ￿ring decisions. Thus, ￿rms will only hire those
workers who face low operating costs and ￿re those workers who face high operating costs.
The hiring and ￿ring costs induce two types of distortions (a gap and a wedge). The presence
of hiring and ￿ring costs reduces labour turnover at any given period, compared to a walrasian
labour market, thereby inducing a gap between the perfectly competitive economy and our non-
walrasian labour market. Second, our model features an inter-temporal wedge that distorts hiring
and ￿ring decisions between two sub-sequent periods. Indeed once workers are inside the ￿rm they
are ￿red only if the discounted stream of future pro￿ts is smaller than the ￿ring costs, on the other
side ￿rms will hire only if the discounted value of future pro￿ts is bigger than the hiring costs.
Because of those two wedges the retention rate, de￿ned as the mass of workers who keep their jobs,
is always bigger than the ￿ring rate. The operating costs, ", are measured in terms of the ￿nal
consumption good.9
Let￿ s now consider the real pro￿t generated by a ￿rm-worker relation whose operating cost is
"t. At this point, it is important to note that while workers value their labour income, wt; in terms
of CPI goods, ￿rms value their revenues in terms of domestic goods. This implies that in the ￿rms￿
pro￿t function we need to normalize wages by multiplying with g(st):
8We assume that the bargaining takes place between the median insider and the ￿rm. This allows us to keep
analytical tractability and to present the reduced form of the model in a more elegant appearance. Notice however
that the main implications of the model would not change under the assumption of individual bargaining with each
marginal worker.
9For permanent technology shocks, it can be assumed that the operating, hiring and ￿ring costs grow at the
same rate as the technological progress. This ensures that the hiring and ￿ring rates are independent of long-run
technological growth. As we only consider mean-reverting technology shocks in this paper, we skip this assumption
for analytical simplicity.
11￿I;t("t) = (1 ￿ ￿
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where ￿I;t are the expected pro￿ts of an incumbent worker (after taxes), w is the real wage, ￿ is
the separation probability, ￿t;j is the stochastic discount factor from period t to j. To simplify the
pro￿t function, we rewrite it in recursive manner:
~ ￿I;t("t) = (1 ￿ ￿
p
t)(atmct ￿ wtg(st) ￿ "t) + Et(￿t;t+1~ ￿I;t+1("t+1)); (18)
where ~ ￿I;t+1("t+1) are future pro￿ts.
We now solve for the dynamics of employment and wages. Because of the abovementioned
timing of events we solve the model backward and derive the hiring and ￿ring decisions for a given
wage schedule. Let￿ s de￿ne the hiring and the ￿ring rate threshold respectively as ￿h;t and ￿f;t:
Hiring decisions are carried as follows. Unemployed workers are hired whenever their operating
cost does not exceed a certain threshold such that the pro￿tability of this worker is higher than




t)ht = (1 ￿ ￿
p
t)(atmct ￿ wtg(st) ￿ ￿h;t) + Et(￿t;t+1~ ￿I;t+1("t+1)): (19)
Unemployed workers whose operating cost is lower than this value get a job, while those whose





Similarly, the ￿rm will ￿re a worker if current losses are higher than the ￿ring cost. Again, a zero
pro￿t condition de￿nes the ￿ring threshold as follows:
￿ft(1 ￿ ￿
p
t) = (1 ￿ ￿
p
t)(atmct ￿ g(st)wt ￿ ￿f;t) + Et(￿t;t+1~ ￿I;t+1("t+1)); (21)





We are now in the position to obtain the aggregate employment evolution. The change in
employment (Nt ￿ Nt￿1) is the di⁄erence between the hiring from the unemployment pool (￿Ut￿1)
and the ￿ring from the employment pool (￿Nt￿1), where Ut￿1 and Nt￿1 are the aggregate un-
employment and employment levels: Nt ￿ Nt￿1 = ￿Ut￿1 ￿ ￿Nt￿1. Letting (nt = Nt=Lt) be the
employment rate, we assume a constant workforce, Lt, and normalize it to one. Therefore, we
obtain the following employment dynamics curve.
nt = nt￿1(1 ￿ ￿t ￿ ￿t) + ￿t. (23)
The unemployment rate is simply ut = 1 ￿ nt.
3.3.2 Wage Bargaining
For simplicity, let the real wage g(st)wt be the outcome of a Nash bargain between the median
worker10 with operating cost "I and her ￿rm. The median worker faces no risk of dismissal
at the negotiated wage. The wage is renegotiated in each period t. Under bargaining agree-
ment, the median worker receives the real wage g(st)wt and the ￿rm receives the expected pro￿t
(1 ￿ ￿
p
t)(atmct ￿ g(st)wt) in each period t. Under disagreement, the worker￿ s fallback income is
g(st)ubt, assumed for simplicity to be equal to the real unemployment bene￿t. The ￿rm￿ s fallback
position is ￿s, where s is the cost for the ￿rm in case of disagreement. This may be a ￿xed cost
of non-production or a cost that is imposed due to a strike. Assuming that disagreement in the
current period does not a⁄ect future surpluses, workers￿surplus is (1 ￿ ￿n
t )g(st)wt ￿g(st)ub, while





tmct ￿ g(st)wt ￿ "I￿
+ s, where "I are the operating costs of the
median worker. Consequently, the Nash-product is:
￿ = (g(st)wt (1 ￿ ￿n











10For simplicity, we allow the median worker to bargain over wages. Alternative settings, such as individual bar-
gaining process with marginal workers, would not a⁄ect the model dynamics. Empirical evidence for the relevance
of union contracts is provided below.
13where ￿ represents the bargaining strength of the worker relative to the ￿rm. Maximizing the










+ (1 ￿ ￿)g(st)ub(1 ￿ ￿
p
t) (25)
= (1 ￿ ￿)g(st)wt (1 ￿ ￿n
t )(1 ￿ ￿
p
t), (26)

















Two considerations on the wage equation are in order:
First, due to the right to manage structures wages lose part of their allocative role compared
to wages negotiated within e¢ cient Nash bargaining arrangements. In the e¢ cient Nash bargaining
individual ￿rms would have to choose wages alongside with hiring and ￿ring decisions. This would
allow wages to be contingent on employment decisions and to adjust faster to shocks. Instead, in
this context wages are negotiated at an aggregate level and ￿rms make hiring and ￿ring decisions
only ex-post.11 This implies, for instance, that negative shocks can a⁄ect worker ￿ ows more strongly
than wages. We believe that such a bargaining arrangement can capture well the reality of Euro area
labour markets in which wages are usually bargained ex-ante at an aggregate level (collectively),
while individual ￿rms make ex-post hiring and ￿ring decision.
Second, equation 27 highlights the e⁄ects of cross-country spillovers through the interaction
between the CPI/PPI ratio and the wage. In standard New Keynesian models, changes in terms
of trade (hence in the CPI/PPI ratio) produce spillovers across countries, as they lead to relative
changes in export demand. A country that increases government expenditure experiences a terms
of trade appreciation, which reduces its net exports compared to the rest of the currency area,
hence neighborhood countries bene￿t from an increase in demand of foreign produced goods. In
our model, changes in the terms of trade have additional e⁄ects on the labour markets. Indeed, the
appreciation in the CPI/PPI ratio, due to the increase in government spending, has the additional
11This is a particular case of a sequential bargaining framework proposed by Manning [16], as ￿rms and workers
fail to internalize the consequences of today·s wage decisions on future hiring and ￿ring decisions. The scope for
pre-commitment is barred as neither workers nor ￿rms can credibly commit to a sequence of future wages and
employment.
14e⁄ect of increasing domestic wages while reducing wages in neighborhood countries. Such a labour
market spillover brings about an increase in labour demand and a reduction in unemployment for
neighborhood countries.
3.3.3 Marginal costs
Marginal costs in this model summarize the set of wedges that characterize the labour market.
To obtain a measure of the marginal cost, we should ￿rst characterize the equilibrium conditions
for labour market ￿ ows. By merging equations 19 and 21 we obtain the following equilibrium
condition:
￿h;t + ht = ￿f;t ￿ ft. (28)
This condition implies that marginal costs can be equally derived from 19 or from 21. The expression
for marginal costs will then read as follows:
mct =
￿








In this context wages lose part of their allocative role as marginal costs depend also on two
additional components. The ￿rst component which is given by ￿h;t+ht is an intra-temporal wedge
which makes hiring (and ￿ring) deviate from the ones that would arise in a walrasian labour market
at any time t: The second component, represented by Et(￿t;t+1~ ￿I;t+1("t+1)); is an inter-temporal
wedge which distorts hiring (and ￿ring) decisions between two sub-sequent dates. This second
wedge represents the long run value of a worker, as by retaining the marginal worker the ￿rm
can earn extra pro￿ts in the future. Because of this positive externality attached to the marginal
worker, retention rates tend to be higher than job ￿nding rates.
3.3.4 Wholesale Sector and Retail Sector
Firms in the wholesale-sector can change their prices every period, facing quadratic Rotemberg























15where ￿ is a parameter measuring the extent of price adjustment costs and ￿ ￿ is the steady state
in￿ ation rate. Taking the derivative with respect to the price yields after some manipulations a
price-setting rule under Rotemberg adjustment costs:







3.4 Workers￿Heterogeneity and Aggregation
We start by deriving aggregate real pro￿ts of intermediate ￿rms which are given by revenues minus
wage payments, operating costs and labour turnover costs:
~ ￿I = mctatnt ￿ g(st)wtnt ￿ nt(1 ￿ ￿t)￿i
t ￿ (32)
(1 ￿ nt)￿t￿e
t ￿ nt￿1￿tft ￿ (1 ￿ nt￿1)￿tht,
where ￿i
t is the expected value of operating costs for insiders, conditional on not being ￿red and
￿e













The real pro￿ts (~ ￿W) of the wholesale sector are given by:









Retailers make zero-pro￿ts. Aggregate real pro￿ts in this economy therefore are given by:












We can substitute this into the budget constraint, (2), and after imposing equilibrium in the
bond market we obtain the following resource constraint:
16(1 + ￿c
t)ct = g(st)wtnt(1 ￿ ￿n

















Equations 37 identi￿es the net income for the domestic economy, which is given by the right
hand side minus the left hand side. In the world economy the domestic net income must be
equalized to net exports, ch;t +c￿
h;t. After imposing market clearing, balanced budget, aggregating
and recalling that ph;t = p￿















The calibration is summarized in table 1 below.
Preferences. The discount rate, ￿, is set to 0:99, consistently with an annual interest rate of
4 percent. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution, ￿ is set to 2. The elasticity of substitution
between di⁄erent product types, ", is set to 10 (see, e.g., Gal￿ [13]). The elasticity of substitution
between home and foreign goods, ￿; is set to 2, consistently with most empirical studies, while the
degree of home bias in consumption, ￿; i set to 0.2, consistently with data for net exports in the
euro area.
Firms and the labour market. The parameter of price adjustments, ￿, is calibrated in line
with microeconometric evidence for Europe (see Alvarez et al. [1]).
The annual average productivity is normalised to 1 (i.e., 0.25 per quarter). The bargaining
power of workers, ￿, is set to a benchmark value of 0:5. Taking continental Europe as reference
point, the ￿ring costs are set to 60 percent (f = 0:6)12 of the annual productivity which amounts to
approximately 66 percent of the annual wage13 and the hiring costs are set to 10 percent (h = 0:1) of
12For an empirically admissible range of values of ￿ring costs our main numerical results are unchanged.
13For the period from 1975 to 1986 Bentolila and Bertola [3] calculate ￿ring costs of 92 percent, 75 percent and
108 percent of the respective annual wage in France, Germany and Italy respectively. The OECD 2004 reports that
many European countries have reduced their job security legislation somewhat from the late 1980 to 2003 (in terms
of the overall employment protection legislation strictness). Therefore, we consider f = 0:6 to be a realistic number
for continental European countries.
17Table 1: Parameters of the Numerical Model
Parameter Description Value Source
￿ Subjective discount factor 0.99 Standard value
￿ Consumption utility 2 Intertemp. elasticity of subst.
" Elasticity of subst. 10 Gal￿ [13]
￿ Price adjustment cost 104.85 Equivalent to ￿ = 0:75
a Annual Productivity 1 Normalization
￿ Workers￿bargaining power 0.5 Standard value
f Firing cost 0.6 Bentolila and Bertola [3]
h Hiring cost 0.1 Chen and Funke [5]
b Unemployment bene￿ts 0.0875 OECD [19]
E(") Expected value of op. costs 0 Normalisation
sd Distr. scaling parameter 0.1325 To match the ￿ ow rates
s Payments under disagreement 0.0561 To match the ￿ ow rates
￿n Income tax 0.41 Trabandt and Uhlig [27]
￿c Consumption tax 0.17 Trabandt and Uhlig [27]
￿p Pro￿t tax 0.33 Trabandt and Uhlig [27]
g=y Governments spending 0.23 Trabandt and Uhlig [27]
annual productivity (see Chen and Funke [5]). The unemployment bene￿ts are set to 8:75 percent
of the level of annual productivity (ub = 0:0875). This implies, that in steady state the wage
replacement rate is roughly 65 percent, which is in line with evidence for continental European
countries (see OECD [19]). Operating costs are assumed to follow a logistic distribution with zero
mean. The scaling parameter of the distribution and the payments under disagreement, s, are
chosen in such a way that the resulting labour market ￿ ow rates match the empirical hiring and
￿ring rates described further below. This yields a scale parameter of 0:1325 and payments under
disagreement to 0:0561. We calibrate our ￿ ow rates using evidence for West Germany, as there
are only Kaplan-Meier functions for individual countries.14 Wilke￿ s [29] Kaplan-Meier functions
indicate that about 20 percent of the unemployed leave their status after one quarter. For a steady
state unemployment rate of 9 percent, a quarterly job ￿nding rate of 2 percent is necessary. This
is roughly in line with Wilke￿ s estimated yearly risk of unemployment. The used ￿ ow numbers are
in line with the OECD [20] numbers for other continental European countries.15 Hence a quarterly
job hiring rate of ￿ = 0:20 and a ￿ring rate of ￿ = 0:02 are reasonable averages for continental
14We choose the Kaplan-Meier functions for Germany, as it is the largest continental European country.
15Although the numbers of the OECD outlook are not directly applicable to our model, since they are built on a
monthly basis, it is possible to adjust them using a method described in Shimer [26].
18European countries.
Fiscal policy parameters. We follow Trabandt and Uhlig [27], so taxes are calibrated as follows
(average of EU-14): ￿c = 17%, ￿n = 41%, ￿p = 33% and the share of government spending is
g=y = 0:23.
3.6 Monetary Policy
An active monetary policy sets the short term nominal interest rate by reacting to an average of










where VH and VF are the weights used to build up an aggregate measure of in￿ ation for the
currency area. As it is customary in the new Keynesian literature we assume b￿ = 1:5; as this
value guarantees determinacy of the equilibrium and avoids explosive paths for in￿ ation. In terms
of monetary policy setting this can be considered as a conservative scenario. Indeed, in some
countries (particularly the US) large ￿scal packages have been implemented over the last year in
face of nearly zero nominal interest rate. For this reason, other authors have considered passive
monetary policy (interest rate pegs) or accommodative monetary policy (reaction to in￿ ation lower
than one). Those alternative assumptions tend to amplify ￿scal multipliers as monetary policy
relinquishes its stabilization role.
3.7 Fiscal policy regimes
Fiscal policy is conducted independently by each country. The single national governments face
the following budget constraint:
gt + ubut ￿ ￿t ￿ ￿c




In the baseline scenario, we assume that ￿c
t = ￿c; ￿
p
t = ￿pand ￿n
t = ￿n and that government
expenditure follows an exogenous process. We assume that the higher expenditures are ￿nanced
by lump-sum taxes.
19We analyze ￿ve di⁄erent ￿scal packages. We assume that only one of the two countries
undertakes the ￿scal stimulus.














t is a surprise increase and ￿g is the autocorrelation of the shock.
2. A temporary consumption tax cut (VAT). We consider temporary cuts in the consumption












t is the surprise increase and ￿￿c is the autocorrelation of the shock. Such a measure a⁄ects
mainly the marginal utility of consumption as shown in equation 4. More speci￿cally a temporary
cut in consumption taxes can increase current private consumption. The quantitative impact of
such a measure depends on the propensity to consume in face of temporary income shocks.













t is the surprise increase and ￿￿n is the autocorrelation of the shock. Such a measure has

















A reduction in ￿n
t reduces wages (before taxes), hence it increases labour demand. This is
particularly bene￿cial in a model with ine¢ cient equilibrium unemployment.
4. Hiring subsidies. In this case the increase in government spending ￿nances a reduction in
hiring costs hence it enters the equation determining the hiring threshold:
(1 ￿ ￿
p
t)(ht ￿ hst) = (1 ￿ ￿
p
t)(atmct ￿ wtg(st) ￿ ￿h;t) + Et(￿t;t+1~ ￿I;t+1("t+1)) (46)






t is the surprise increase and ￿hs is the autocorrelation of the shock.
From the above expression, it is clear that a reduction in hiring costs increases the mass of
hired workers. Such a measure can be potentially very bene￿cial in sclerotic labour markets.
5. Short-time work ("Kurzarbeit" in Germany). To implement the last measure we reason as
follows. Whenever an employee does not generate a contemporaneous pro￿t, the ￿rm is allowed to
reduce the working time of this worker by a share (1 ￿ ￿), which is set by the government. This
will a⁄ect the ￿rm￿ s endogenous ￿ring cut-o⁄. The government will pay unemployment bene￿ts for
the respective share. We assume that ￿ (1 in the steady state, i.e. no short-time work possibilities)










Following the literature (see Perotti 2004), the coe¢ cient of autocorrelation of government
spending is calibrated to ￿g = 0:9. For comparability reasons, we use the same number for all ￿scal
measures.
4 Fiscal Multipliers and Open Economy Spillovers
4.1 Baseline Scenarios
For the ￿ve ￿scal packages described above, we compute short run and long run multipliers16 and
open economy spillovers. In all cases we assume that only the domestic economy undertakes the
￿scal measure. Results are summarized in table 2.
Pure demand stimulus. In this case, both the short run and the long run multipliers are
very small. An increase in government spending has three detrimental e⁄ects. First, as already
highlighted by the previous literature (see for instance Cogan, Cwik, Taylor and Wieland [7], Cwik
16Short-run multipliers are calculated as output e⁄ects during the impact period divided by costs during the
impact period. Long-run multipliers are the discounted output e⁄ects divided by the discounted costs. All graphs
are normalised such that they represent a 0.5 percent of GDP spending package during the implementation period.
To make government spending and tax multipliers comparable, we calculate the multipliers based on the steady state
values for all endogeneous variables.
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TERMS OF TRADE (%DEVIATION)
Home Perspective
Figure 1: Impulse responses to temporary increase in government spending (normalised to 0.5% of
GDP).
and Wieland [9], Uhlig [28]), government expenditures have to ￿nanced via taxes (in our case
lump-sum taxes). This reduces available income and thereby consumption, as shown in ￿gure 1,
illustrating the impulse response to a temporary increase in government spending. Note that our
assumption about balanced budgets is irrelevant for this result. Due to Ricardian equivalence,
a shift of the tax burden to future periods would be anticipated and reduce consumption in the
exact same way. Second, in an open economy context an increase in aggregate demand leads to an
increase in domestic prices relative to foreign prices. This reduces export demand for the country
which implements the ￿scal stimulus and improves the trade balance for the foreign country (see
￿gure 1). Finally, a fall in terms of trade, triggered by an increase in government spending, leads
to a fall in the CPI/PPI ratio, which in turn leads to an increase in domestic wages as highlighted
by equation 27. The ensuing fall in labour demand triggers a reduction in output. Hence the initial
increase in government spending is counteracted by three detrimental e⁄ects. This explains the
nearly zero output multiplier.
In principle, the foreign country should bene￿t from the terms of trade appreciation. Due
22to the increase in ￿scal spending, prices in the domestic economy rise relative to foreign prices,
hence demand switches from domestic to foreign goods. Such switching expenditure e⁄ects are
governed mainly by two parameters: the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods,
￿; and the degree of home bias in consumption of the domestic economy, ￿: The higher the values for
those parameters the higher is the switch in demand toward foreign goods.17 Moreover, as explained
earlier, an increase in the CPI/PPI ratio induces an increase in domestic wages and conversely a fall
in foreign wages. This labour market spillover can potentially boost labour demand in the foreign
economy. Overall, changes in relative wages induce changes in relative marginal costs, which, in
turn, bring about changes in employment and job ￿ ows across countries. Despite the fact that
those two e⁄ects should operate in favor of boosting output in the foreign economy, the spillover
e⁄ects (increase in foreign output and aggregate demand) are nearly zero. Indeed, a temporary
￿scal stimulus in the foreign country combined with low values for ￿ and ￿, makes such demand
spillovers rather small, the more so in a currency area. The reason for this is mostly related to
the fact that we consider a currency area model: shutting o⁄ the exchange rate channel abates
movements in terms of trade and net exports, hence both the spillover through aggregate demand
and the spillover through relative wages are small.
To highlight the role of labour market frictions and the open economy, we perform the same
government spending exercise in a frictionless closed economy18 and in a closed economy with
labour market frictions. It can be seen in ￿gure 2 that a traditional demand stimulus generates
a substantially larger e⁄ect in a frictionless closed economy model than in a model with labour
turnover costs. The reason is straightforward. Labour turnover costs make employment adjustment
more costly. As a consequence, the price for intermediate goods increases and this dampens the
expansionary e⁄ects. As expected, the open economy dimension reduces the e⁄ects of government
spending due to spillover e⁄ects: the appreciation of the terms of trade, following the increase in
government spending, reduces net exports, hence aggregate demand is below the one prevailing in
the closed economy model.
17The baseline calibration for ￿ and ￿ follows the ones mostly used in the open economy literature and the one
which received the largest empirical support. Notice that robustness checks along this dimension show that open
economy spillovers remain almost unchanged when using other empirically valid calibrations.
18We use a separable utility function with the same speci￿cation for consumption as in our model and with a
quadratic disutility of labor.
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Figure 2: Model comparison for government spending shocks
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Figure 3: Impulse responses to temporary cut to consumption (VAT) taxes (normalised to 0.5% of
GDP).
24Consumption (VAT) tax cuts. In this case multipliers are nearly zero. The reason,
already discussed in the previous literature (see for instance Cogan, Cwik, Taylor and Wieland
[7]) is twofold. First, as for the case of a pure demand stimulus, cuts in consumption tax are
￿nanced by increases in the lump-sum tax. Second, to the extent that consumption tax cuts
are temporary, permanent income theory suggests that the impact on private consumption is very
small (previous empirical studies have highlighted a propensity to consume in this case around 0.3).
Hence the positive e⁄ect coming from the tax cut is not big enough to compensate the negative
e⁄ect associated with future expectations of tax increases.
Spillovers to the foreign country are nearly zero, too. Figure 3 shows that the improvement in
foreign trade balance is negligible. The reason is similar to the one outlined for the case of a pure
demand stimulus.
Income tax cuts. For this experiment, and contrary to the case with consumption tax cuts,
the multipliers are pretty large in the long-run. Most importantly, long run multipliers are larger
than short run multipliers. This result is very much in line with the ones highlighted in Uhlig [28],
who shows that tax cuts tend to produce positive e⁄ects mainly in the long run. In our case this
result is even stronger as the long run multiplier is around one. The reason being that this measure
has a direct and strong impact on labour market outcomes.

















it is immediate to see that a cut in ￿n
t reduces wages (before taxes), hence leads to an increase
in labour demand (see also ￿gure 4 which shows the impulse responses to a cut in income taxes,
normalised to 0.5% of GDP). In this respect, our model highlights a novel dimension through which
￿scal stimuli might lead to large multipliers. In this case, however, ￿scal multipliers operate through
supply side e⁄ects rather than through traditional demand side e⁄ects. This is further highlighted
by ￿gure 5, comparing the e⁄ects of income tax cuts in a frictionless economy and a closed economy
with labor market frictions. In contrast to the case of traditional government spending, the e⁄ects
of income tax cuts are more bene￿cial in the presence of labor turnover costs.
Two additional considerations are in order. First, we have parameterised workers￿bargaining
power to 0:5. Lower values for this parameter would induce a greater elasticity of labour demand,
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Figure 4: Impulse responses to temporary cut of income taxes (normalised to 0.5% of GDP).
hence they would amplify the ￿scal multipliers. Second, in our model labour demand changes take
place only at the extensive margin (number of workers); if we were to include an intensive margin
(endogenous choice of labour hours) the ￿scal multiplier would likely be even larger.
Again positive spillovers to the other countries are rather small. In this case they operate
mainly through a reduction in foreign wages as the foreign trade balance even turns negative.
Hiring subsidies. Multipliers are very large for this case. This is even more so for long
run multipliers. Hiring costs are strongly distortionary in our model, as they increase the steady
state unemployment rate. A reduction in hiring costs increases the hiring threshold as shown in
equation 46 and reduces ￿rms￿marginal costs, as shown by equation 29. The ensuing increase
in employment (see ￿gure 6 which shows impulse responses in this case) pushes output toward
the pareto e¢ cient level. In this case the increase in government spending does not produce any
crowding out of private demand; on the contrary, it helps to boost private consumption.
The e⁄ects of hiring subsidies probably have to be considered as a upper bound. We assume
that the wage is bargained between incumbent workers and the ￿rm. This is a very realistic
assumption for central European countries. Collective bargaining coverage in countries such as
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Figure 5: Model comparison for income tax cuts
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Figure 6: Impulse responses to temporary increase in government spending to ￿nance hiring sub-
sidies (normalised to 0.5% of GDP).
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Figure 7: Impulse responses to a temporary increase in government spending dedicated to short-
time work (normalised to 0.5% of GDP).
Austria, Belgium, France, Germany or the Netherlands lies within the range of 68% to 97.5 % (see
OECD [20]). However, in countries where part of the contracts are bargained by individualistic
bargaining, this would reduce the multipliers somewhat. A hiring subsidy increases the value of
unemployment, which leads to a higher wage under individualistic bargaining. As a consequence,
displacement e⁄ects would reduce the e⁄ect of hiring subsidies somewhat.
Again spillover e⁄ects are positive but small and as the income tax cut a⁄ects relative wages
across countries they operate mainly through the labour market.
Short-time work (Kurzarbeit). In this case ￿rms can reduce the working time of workers
with low productivity. The domestic government then reimburses a part of these workers lost wage
income. Overall, output multipliers are negative in the short-run (see ￿gure 7) While ￿rms retain
more workers, they only use a smaller share of their working time, thereby reducing the labour
input and the output in the short-run. However, short-time work has non-negligible positive long-
run multipliers. To understand the transmission of ￿scal shocks, in this case we also computed
































Figure 8: Employment and output e⁄ects for di⁄erent programmes (all normalised to 0.5% of GDP)
employment multipliers, which are equal to about 1.5 in the short run.19 Those results can be
rationalised as follows. On the one side, ￿nancing part of the wage bill lowers the ￿ring threshold,
hence increases the number of employed workers. This explains the large employment multipliers.
On the other side, short-time work endogenously reduces average worker productivity, since workers
with very low productivity are kept instead of being ￿red.
Spillovers are again very small. The increase in the number of employed people, accompanied
by the fall in productivity, increases ￿rms￿marginal costs. The ensuing increase in the CPI level
abates demand growth in the whole area.
Table 2: Summary of ￿scal multipliers and spillovers across countries for di⁄erent ￿scal packages.
Demand stim. VAT cut Inc. tax cut Hiring subs. STW
Home, short-run 0.22 0.01 0.29 1.89 -1.24
Home, long-run 0.28 0.00 0.99 5.03 1.90
Foreign, short-run -0.01 0.00 0.07 0.49 0.37
Foreign, long-run 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.10 0.10
Summary. Table 2 summarises the output multipliers in the home country (i.e., the country
19When 0.5 percent of GDP are devoted to short-time work, this increases employment by roughly 0.75 percentage
points.






































Figure 9: Response of output under four ￿scal packages (pure demand stimulus, income tax cut,
hiring subsidy and short time work). Announced (dashed line)versus announced (solid line) policy.
that performs the ￿scal stimulus) and the foreign country (i.e., the country that remains passive,
denoted as spillover). Figure 8 provides an overview of the impulse response functions for output
and employment for all ￿ve measures, where the initial ￿scal stimulus is normalised to 0.5% of
GDP.
4.2 Announcement E⁄ect
In most cases, ￿scal measures su⁄er of implementation delays. The political process and other
factors prevent governments from making ￿scal intervention immediately e⁄ective at the time of
the announcement. Such delays can abate the bene￿ts of expansionary ￿scal policies. For this
reason, it is realistic to compare multipliers for the case of no implementation delays, which we
call unannounced policy, and for the case of ￿ve quarters implementation delays (a realistic time
span), which we call announced policy. Figure 9 shows the response of output under the announced
(dashed line) and the unannounced policy (solid line). We exclude the case of consumption tax cuts,
since as before multipliers are nearly zero. Under a pure demand stimulus, short run multipliers are
negative for the ￿rst ￿ve quarters. This is so since the detrimental e⁄ect of anticipating future tax









































Figure 10: Response of output under four ￿scal packages (pure demand stimulus, income tax
cut, hiring subsidy and short time work) and starting from a recession scenario. Case with ￿scal
intervention (dashed line) versus case with not ￿scal intervention (solid line).
increases is not compensated by any increase in government spending in the ￿rst ￿ve quarters. In
contrast, announcements tend to amplify ￿scal multipliers for income tax cuts due to the bene￿cial
e⁄ect on labor demand due to anticipated lower future labor costs. Under the hiring subsidy
policies, the announcement simply delays the e⁄ects of the ￿scal stimulus, which remains almost
unaltered in terms of size. Most interesting is the case of short-time work. Immediately after
announcing the policy, output goes up. Firms increase their workforce, knowing that unproductive
workers can be sent on short-time work in the future. Thus, the anticipation of short-time work
reduces the risk of employing workers and employment goes up. Once the policy is implemented,
output drops considerably. This is the case since some workers are sent on short-time work and
this reduces average productivity.
4.3 Starting from Recession Scenario
Recently, unprecedented ￿scal measures have been undertaken, largely to counteract the reces-
sionary impact of the ￿nancial crisis. For this reason it seems realistic to reassess the size of the
31multipliers starting from a recession scenario, which we implement through a productivity slow-
down,20 although we are aware that the recent crisis was not generated solely by a productivity
slowdown. Figure 10 shows the response of output for the case in which the initial recession is not
followed by any policy intervention (solid line) and for the case in which a policy intervention is in
place (dashed line). As before, we do not show results for the consumption tax cuts as multipliers
are nearly zero. For the remaining four ￿scal measures previous results are largely con￿rmed. Pure
demand stimulus has negligible e⁄ects compared to the situation in which the economy recovers
from the recession in absence of policy intervention. Income tax cuts and hiring subsidies help to
recover fast from the recession. As for short-time work, it helps to abate the reduction in employ-
ment, it aggravates the recession in the short run21 and it strengthens the recovery in the medium
run.
5 Putting our Work in the Empirical Perspective
While there is much agreement on the stylized facts of monetary policy, the e⁄ects of ￿scal policy
are a lot more debated. The empirical studies agree that an increase in government spending
implies a positive short-run output reaction (see, e.g., Blanchard and Perotti [4], FatÆs and Mihov
[12] or Mountford and Uhlig [17], where this holds only in the short-run), which is in line with the
results of this paper. However, there is much less agreement about the actual size of government
multipliers, depending on the employed methodology and the country. Perotti [21] concludes, for
example, that government spending multipliers for most countries (except for the United States in
the pre-1980 period) are small (i.e., smaller than 1). While traditional government stimuli generate
very small output multipliers in our dynamic model, spending measures that are targeted at the
labour market can generate quite large multipliers. Therefore, our theoretical analysis calls for a
closer empirical look at the e⁄ects of di⁄erent spending components; particularly those which are
targeted at the labour market.
The empirical literature also predicts positive multipliers for de￿cit-￿nanced tax cuts (see
Blanchard and Perotti [4] and Mountford and Uhlig [17]). While there is no agreement about
20We assume a one percent productivity shock with autocorrelation coe¢ cient 0.95.
21The ￿rst two observations would be in line with the experience in Germany, where short-time work composed an
important part of the business cycle package (e 14 billion in 2009). Compared to other European countries, Germany
had one of the most severe output drops in 2009, but relatively stable unemployment.
32the exact size of the multipliers, Mountford and Uhlig [17] (p. 983) identify the following common
feature: ￿the e⁄ect on output of a change in tax revenues is persistent and large.￿Our labor market
model rationalizes why the e⁄ects of income spending cuts may be large. Further, the labor market
generates a very persistent output reaction for income tax cuts (see ￿gure 4).
There is probably least agreement about the reaction of consumption to positive government
spending shocks. Blanchard and Perotti [4] ￿nd a positive reaction, while Mountford and Uhlig [17]
￿nd almost no reaction at all. In contrast, Edelberg, Eichenbaum and Fisher [10] conclude that
consumption falls in response to an increase government spending. While our theoretical model
predicts a behavior for traditional government stimuli, which is in line with the second view, it is
not necessarily at odds with the ￿rst view. Government spending that is targeted at the labour
market may generate substantial increases in consumption (see ￿gures 6 and 7). Thus, our model
is able to rationalize a positive consumption reaction to government spending, without resorting to
the assumption of rule of thumb consumers, as put forward by Gal￿, L￿pez-Salido and VallØs [14].22
Overall, our simulation results are well in line with the empirical evidence on the e⁄ects of
government spending and tax cuts. Our model o⁄ers a potential new explanation for the positive
consumption e⁄ects of government spending.
6 Conclusions
We have used an open economy model with labour market frictions in the form of labour turnover
costs to measure ￿scal multipliers. We have done so for di⁄erent types of ￿scal packages. Income
tax cuts and hiring subsidies deliver large output stimuli, particularly in the long run. Overall,
measures directed toward reducing labour market distortions are associated with large multipliers.
Mixed results emerge under an extension of short-time work; although this measure increases the
number of employed workers, there is a signi￿cant drop in their productivity. Overall our model
highlights a novel dimension through which ￿scal stimuli can operate, namely a supply side channel
that boosts labour demand. We test and con￿rm our results under alternative realistic assumptions
such as announced policies and recessionary scenarios.
22Rule of thumb consumers have the disadvantage that they are very ad-hoc and di¢ cult to reconcile with the
spirit of rational expectations models. It has to be noted that rule of thumb consumers do not really represent
credit-constrained consumers, as those would at least be able to save, which rule of thumb consumers do not by
assumption.
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367 Appendix 1: Sources for Fiscal Stimulus Packages
Germany - Source:
1. German Government: http://www.konjunkturpaket.de.
2. http://www.faz.net/s/RubEC1ACFE1EE274C81BCD3621EF555C83C/Doc~EA3A5D8CEFD6A4E4C99DE776BD87EEBC3~ATpl~Ecommon~Scontent.html
















8 Appendix 2: Technical Details on Short-Time Work
A a retained worker has the following pro￿t function.
~ ￿I;t("t) = (1 ￿ ￿
p

































37~ ￿I;t("t) = (1 ￿ ￿
p
t)(atmct ￿ wtg(st) ￿ "t) + Et(￿t;t+1~ ￿I;t+1("t+1)): (50)
A ￿rm is eligible for short-time work whenever the following condition holds (i.e., the worker
generates no pro￿t in the current period):
(1 ￿ ￿
p
t)(atmct ￿ wtg(st) ￿ "t) < 0: (51)
The cut-o⁄ for short-time work is:





When a worker is eligible, the ￿rm does not have to pay for a certain share of his wage and
the operating costs. In return, the input of the worker is reduced proportionally. Let￿ s assume that
this share is equal to ￿, which follows an autoregressive process. Thus, the ￿rms pro￿ts are:
~ ￿s;t("t) = ￿(1 ￿ ￿
p








t+1)(at+1mct+1 ￿ wt+1g(st+1) (55)
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Hiring and ￿ring thresholds are endogenously determined as follows:
38ht(1 ￿ ￿
p
t) = (1 ￿ ￿
p
t)(atmct ￿ wtg(st) ￿ ￿h;t) + Et(￿t;t+1~ ￿I;t+1("t+1)); (56)
￿ft(1 ￿ ￿
p
t) = ￿(1 ￿ ￿
p
t)(atmct ￿ wtg(st) ￿ "t) + Et(￿t;t+1~ ￿I;t+1("t+1)): (57)
Equation 57 shows that ￿ reduces the ￿ring threshold, which, however, implies a reduction in
the workers￿productivity.
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